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Critical Realism: The required philosophical 
compass for inclusion? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although during recent years in the field of special education there has been much debate regarding 
inclusion and people’s beliefs around disability, it is suggested that what has been lacking in many 
of the discussions is any coherent guiding philosophy that helps direct research in this area.  
The paper proposes that critical realism, developed by philosopher Roy Bhaskar, may provide such 
a framework and offers a philosophical 'compass' (Egbo, 2005) to researchers who want to be 
engaged in critical social scientific inquiry. The paper will briefly outline the main ontological and 
epistemological tenets of critical realism before exploring these in relation to the literature in the 
fields of disability, inclusion and special education. Finally it suggests that critical realism avoids 
many of the fallacies associated with educational research and could be seen as useful way forward 
in the debate around inclusion and propose where further research is required. 
Introduction 
After working in special education for fifteen years, including five years a senior leader, it was 
interesting to note that a focus on beliefs and values that inform the education phenomenon of 
special education was never acknowledged or challenged. 
There were undoubtedly discussions about which children were ‘eligible’ for special education and 
the role of special education in an inclusive education environment but much of this came down to 
individual discussion and debate rather than a philosophically reasoned argument. Individual’s 
ontological and epistemological groundings were certainly never mentioned, and therefore it was 
difficult to sometimes understand where people were ‘coming from’ never mind how 
philosophically sound or not their rationale was.  
I would suggest that discourses in the fields of inclusion and disability continue to present 
competing views of what is legitimate or not, as various paradigms vie to establish their legitimacy. 
I propose that what is lacking in many of the discourses is any coherent guiding philosophy that 
helps direct discussion and ultimately research. Therefore the proposed focus of this paper is to 
explore disability, special education and inclusion using a critical realist philosophical framework 
with which to critically review the literature before moving onto a proposed way forward. 
Critical Realism 
I believe that critical realism, developed by Roy Bhaskar, may be helpful in providing a framework 
which offers a philosophical 'compass' (Egbo, 2005) to researchers who want to be engaged in 
critical social scientific inquiry. Roy Bhaskar is seen as the key theorist in the development of 
critical research through his work in the late 1970’s onwards and he continues to develop and refine 
critical realism. His work can be quite inaccessible at times due to the ‘dense’ language and style of 
putting the key concepts into detailed formulae and so the work of other key theorists in developing 
critical realism to become more accessible and clearly explained has been important (Archer, 1995; 
Collier, 1994; Corson, 1991b). 
Critical realism is a philosophy of science and as such it offers a meta-theory, that is, one which 
embraces ontological and epistemological elements, which tells us what structures, entities and 
mechanisms make up the social world (Bhaskar, 1978, 1989 a, 1989 b). For the purposes of this 
paper, ontology is identified as the ‘world as it is’ and epistemology as the ‘world as we know it’, or 
in other words our ‘knowledge’ of it (Collier, 1994).  
What I intend to do in this paper is firstly explore the ontological and epistemological premises of 
critical realism before identifying its main tenets, which will then enable me to review the relevant 
literature about inclusion, disability and special education and subsequent discourses.  
An important aspect to realist social theory is that it is based in three ontological premises about 
social reality: firstly, that of intransitivity; secondly, the stratification of reality and; thirdly, the 
presence and role of causal relations operating in social reality (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, 
& Norrie, 1998; Collier, 1994; Egbo, 2005; Warner, 1993). It is to these that I shall now turn. 
Intransitivity 
One of the most important philosophical distinctions associated with Bhaskar's critical realism is the 
one made between intransitive and transitive objects of knowledge.  
The intransitive dimension consists of objects of knowledge that are 'in general invariant (non 
changing relationship) with respect to our knowledge of them; they are the real things and 
structures, mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities of the world; and for the most part 
they are quite independent of us'  (Bhaskar, 1978). 
An example of this could be seen to be the relationship between special education leader and parent 
in the special education setting. Often the parent takes on a subservient role in meetings whereas 
they have at least as much and often more to contribute but can feel intimidated by the status of the 
leader as a professional. Whilst the professional feels they do (should) have the greater ‘knowledge’ 
in relation to the child’s disability and so take on the role of imparter of knowledge. In the 
intransitive dimension neither party is aware of the underlying structures, mechanisms and 
processes at play. 
The Transitive dimension is seen as consisting of our knowledge of the world. Using the same 
example as for the intransitive dimension, in this case both parent and professional, or at least one 
of them, are now aware of the way the knowledge relationship is commonly viewed and acted out. 
Either or both may then continue to act as before or not but the key difference is now there is 
knowledge regarding what mechanisms are present. 
To try and clarify things further, critical realists, and I count myself in this, believe that human 
beings and their social relationships exist in the natural world.  Thus, social structures are real if 
changing things; they are social things and as such have their own qualities, independent of our 
knowledge and understanding of them. More over, such social structures have to be discovered as 
they are not transparently obvious to us.  
I believe in the possibility that some things that exist in the intransitive dimension can become 
progressively known through the interaction between human theory and experience of the world. 
Indeed, I see this as the reason in undertaking research into society and its structures in order that 
relationships can be explored and attempts at explaining them undertaken in order to gradually try 
and understand the world, the intransitive objects of knowledge, in the transitive dimension, with 
the ultimate goal of bringing about social change where inequalities are exposed. This fits closely 
with critical realism which aims to interpret in the world in order to ultimately bring about change, 
as Bhaskar (1989) states: 'the world cannot be rationally changed unless it is adequately interpreted' 
(p5).  
I will now move onto the second ontological premise: the belief in the stratification of reality. 
Stratification of reality 
For critical realists the world of existing things is stratified (Collier, 1994; Warner, 1993). There 
would appear to be two elements in relation to the way that stratification is exemplified by critical 
realist.  
For Archer (1998) stratification of reality is identified as ‘both the horizontal and vertical 
explanations of why they (structures, processes) are occurring, that is, historical factors and 
current context’ (p.196) (information in bold added by author). This relates to the need for a good 
level of contextual knowledge; historical, political and social, in order to attempt to interpret the 
mechanisms present. 
The other element to the stratification of reality is the ontological distinction drawn between what 
are called the domains of reality namely; Empirical, Actual and Real (Collier, 1994; Outhwaite, 
1998; Sayer, 1992; Scott, 2005; Warner, 1993). 
My interpretation follows the work of Warner (1993) quite closely but also draws on the work of 
others who have similar but not identical views of what Bhaskar means in relation to the 3 domains 
as this is beyond the scope of this paper(Collier, 1994; Sayer, 2000; Scott, 2005).  
I understand Empirical to be viewed as things that we can experience through our senses or 
perceptions of what is occurring, these by their very nature can be misleading such as how are brain 
can interpret what are eyes see inaccurately, such as line patterns which look like they are not 
horizontal but in fact are, or the way we perceive how things operate. Using the example given 
previously with the meeting between professional and parent; the parent may be trying to be as 
helpful as possible by giving a range of strategies that have worked with their child at home, 
whereas the professional perceives that the parent is criticising their current practice. 
I view Actual as the events that happen in the world outside of our perception of them, using the 
same example again; the actual reality is that the meeting takes place and that a range of perceptions 
are at play between the two people in the meeting. 
Finally, I see Real as the mechanisms and structures that have causal powers which may or may not 
be exercised. Again using the same example, the critical realist view is that there are likely to be 
power/knowledge relationships which exist between the professional and parent; professional as the 
holder of ‘privileged’ knowledge and experience against the ‘amateur’ knowledge of the parent. 
These power/knowledge relationship mechanisms may or may not be exercised and are therefore 
seen as tendencies. If they do operate the reality has moved into the Actual domain. The aim of 
critical realist research is to uncover the mechanisms in the real domain and their causal powers, 
acknowledging that these may or may not be exercised. This has a crucial implication for this 
ontology as it is ‘the recognition of the possibility that powers may exist unexercised and therefore 
what has happened or been known to have happened does not mean this is the limit of what could 
happen or have happened, this therefore makes it possible to understand how we could be or 
become many things which currently we are not’ (Sayer, 2000, p 13). 
The final significant aspect in relation to the 3 domains is that of the independence of the real 
domain from the others (Collier, 1994; Corson, 1997; Dobson, 2002; Sayer, 2000; Scott, 2005). I 
see this as noteworthy as it is closely related to the distinction that is often made between open and 
closed systems; where ‘open’ systems are those viewed as having multiple mechanisms and 
interactions taking place at any one time and that these can never be exactly replicated and that this 
must be recognised within any claims regarding generalisation sought from research.  
Causal relations 
A major element to the following examination of causal relations in relation to the critical realist 
perspective is that of the belief in ‘the dual character view of the world’, that is, the mutually 
interactive nature of society and individual (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1989 a, 1998b; Collier, 1994; 
Corson, 1991b).  
This is the view that individuals and social structures have a degree of independency and 
interdependency which brings about the ‘riddle’ of structure and agency, where structure is viewed 
in relation to the social structures at play and agency is identified as human purposiveness such as 
wants, beliefs, desires and emotions (Archer, 1995).  
In other words, this means that the critical realist view of social reality is that individuals both 
reproduce and transform social structures as well as are formed by them, whilst social structures 
both shape and place constraints on individuals but are also the result of continuous activity by 
individuals. In Bhaskar’s words: ‘…society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices 
and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they 
did so’(Bhaskar, 1998b, p.36). This is important in that it brings about the possibility of 
transformational social activity as identified in Figure 1 which means that the critical realist view is 
that there is the opportunity for individuals to impact on society whilst recognising the impact 
society does have on individuals. 
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Figure 1 The Transformational Model of Social Activity (Bhaskar, 1998b, p 217) 
 
An example could be, if it is presumed that leaders in special education will play a transforming 
role in helping to bring about a more inclusive educational system, how they can interact with social 
structures/mechanisms, such as their attitudes and beliefs in order to bring this about. What I 
propose is that this research and literature is missing in the current debate. 
In its original form the model of transformational social activity is probably a little too simplistic 
and Bhaskar (1989b) does go on to provide some crucial revisions to his original thoughts in which 
explores structure and praxis in the interaction between society and individuals. 
In elaborating what is meant by agency, Archer (1995) argues that we 'need to distinguish between 
collective agents and individual actors. The reality experienced by the collectivity is not reducible 
to the personal reactions of its members; nor is the subjectivity of the latter understandable without 
reference to the objectivity of the former' (p 120). 
Having explored structure and agency as viewed from a critical realist perspective the other 
significant element to review in relation to causal relations is that of structure and more implicitly, 
mechanisms. In assisting with understanding the interplay between society and individual, structure 
and agency it is helpful to refer directly to Bhaskar who states: ‘Society is not the unconditioned 
creation of human agency (voluntarism) but neither does it exist independently of it (reification). 
And individual action neither completely determines (individualism) nor is completely determined 
by (determinism) social forms. In, unintended consequences, unacknowledged conditions and tacit 
skills…limit the actor’s understanding of the social world, while unacknowledged (unconscious) 
motivation limits one’s understanding of oneself’ (1979, p 286). 
The realist explanation of how things occur is that the outcome of an action follows from 
mechanisms acting in particular contexts. Or in other words, how is the leadership (action) informed 
by the attitudes, values and beliefs (mechanisms) of individual leaders within their professional 
lives (context) and how does this impact on what actually happens (outcome), as identified in 
Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3 – A Realist Model of Outcomes (adapted from Robson, 2002) 
Four concepts can be identified from Bhaskar’s Realist Theory of Science (1978), they are 
structures, powers, generative mechanisms and tendencies (Collier, 1994). As examined in the 
section on stratification of reality, by using the word power and tendencies this draws attention to 
the existence of unexercised powers and of exercised but unrealised tendencies. I would concur 
with other researchers who have noted the need to be careful in attributing impact of one 
mechanism to another mechanism as society, and in this case, education is operating in an open 
system (Sayer, 2000; Scott, 2005). It is also important to acknowledge that patterns of events do not 
replicate exactly across settings but that that there are many common causal factors present and the 
levels of impact of these causal factors will vary but by knowing more about these causal factors 
and possible interplay then 'tendencies' can be drawn (Robson, 2002; Scott, 2005; Warner, 1993).  
Epistemology 
As critical realism is originally based on transcendental realism it clearly keeps ontological and 
epistemological groundings separate and sees this as vital in ensuring that there is not a fall into the 
‘epistemic fallacy’; where ontology and epistemology are conflated so that it is not possible to 
understand how transitive methods may be used to examine relatively intransitive structures 
(Bhaskar, 1978; Scott, 2005).  
Having explored the ontological premises of critical realism, I will now explore where these lead 
from an epistemological standpoint with reference to the following: knowledge and discourse; 
values and beliefs; and, critical realism as a form of scientific discovery. I will then identify what I 
see as key tenets with regards to using critical realism to explore the literature in relation to 
disability, special education and inclusion, before identifying why I believe the role of leaders, 
namely those in special education, is crucial in the debate about developing a more inclusive 
educational system. 
Knowledge and discourse 
Critical realists see systems of discourse, or Professional Knowledge, and material social structures 
as somewhat autonomous, yet mutually influencing one another, as was explored in the section on 
causal relations. Hence it can be said that critical realists view knowledge as being socially 
produced and therefore also transient.  
In line with this critical realist view, MacIntyre (1981) identifies that these discourses or ‘traditions 
of thought’ are manifested in human behaviour but are subject to change and decay. These 
discourses are often nested within ‘supra-discourses’ (Scott, 2000) and these are best defined as the 
way a society or group of people understand the nature of the world and how it can be known, their 
ontological and epistemological beliefs. These not only influence the type of discourse operating 
within the group but also the rate of decay of these discourses.  
Given the critical realist view of the intransitive and transitive objects of knowledge another aspect 
of its epistemology relates to the belief that all knowledge is fallible. Therefore, what is accepted as 
a view of ‘truth’ by society or groups within society is not so much about its level of correctness but 
more as to its function as to how particular communities of people construct and reconstruct forms 
of knowledge. Thus what is seen as ‘real’ by those communities at those particular times of history 
could be seen as a form of ‘virtual reality’ (Giddens, 1984).  
In the field of critical realism there seems to be a divergence of thought in relation to a ‘theory of 
truth’. With Warner (1993) talking about Convergence Theory of Truth which is important to the 
realist perspective that some notion of scientific progress be maintained. Warner (1993) states that 
he believes that there is a convergence theory of truth where there is a gradual convergence between 
the conventional use of words and the way the world actually is, i.e. water was just water until more 
was known about its structures etc. Whereas Collier (1994) talks about Correspondence Theory of 
Truth, which is very similar to convergence but he believes is a more accurate description of what 
is happening in the transitive dimension. Interestingly, Bhaskar rejects both ideas as he holds the 
concept of fallibility as essential. Collier believes this is a mistake and is as much down to a 
misunderstanding of the term correspondence which he views to mean the relation that holds when 
as it is said, so it is. In my view it is not crucial to accept either the convergence or correspondence 
version as the key point is that of fallibility.  
Previously, I think I would have related to the idea of convergence theory of truth as it would have 
sat more closely with my understanding of gradually finding more out about whatever is being 
studied, whereas now I prefer the correspondence theory as it appears to be more closely allied to 
the concept of society and individuals being better able to understand and explain the subject 
without believing that there is an ‘ultimate’ truth which we will get to. 
I will now move onto the issue of values and beliefs from a critical realist epistemological 
standpoint. 
Values and beliefs 
It must be recognised that for many researchers the whole area of values and beliefs in research is 
potentially fraught with problems when it comes to discussing these in relation to the social 
sciences. This is possibly why some researchers believe that research should be value and belief 
neutral (Hegarty, 2001; Kavale & Mostert, 2005; Wilson, 1999).  
This is not the case in critical realism with an important element to note being that realism can 
sustain ‘the intransitivity of beliefs and meanings’ (Bhaskar, 1978, 1989 a). Bhaskar also goes onto 
state  
‘human sciences are necessarily non-neutral; that they are intrinsically critical 
(both of beliefs and their objects) and self-critical; that accounts of social reality 
are not only value-impregnated but value-impregnating, not only practically-
imbued but practically-imbuing; and that in particular they both causally 
motivate and logically entail evaluative and practical judgements ceteris paribus’ 
(1989a, p 409).  
In relation to beliefs, I believe it is helpful to distinguish between has, holds and holds the 
consolidated beliefs when discussing these areas in relation to the competing perspectives in 
disability and inclusion.  
Has relates to a belief that plays a causal role in the actions of the actor; holds - where the actor 
reflectively endorses a belief that they can defend against reasonable criticisms to their own 
satisfaction by pointing to a body of evidence to support it, and, holds the consolidated beliefs – 
where a particular belief belongs to a group of rationally acceptable beliefs that no longer require 
further investigation (Lacy, 1997).  
Clark et al (1995), also talk about the issue of 'groundedness of perspectives', individual actors 
bringing their own perspectives, values, and knowledge to bear on any given situation, their 
individual constructions of reality. Consideration of these issues has been lacking in much of the 
literature related to disability, special education and inclusion. I would suggest that often writers 
will espouse very strident views in relation to the fields identified but it is often not clear what 
philosophical paradigm they are coming from in terms of their ontological and epistemological 
beliefs. I will explore this in more detail through the literature as I believe that it is crucial, if the 
current debates are to make significant progress, for writers to be clear in relation to the underlying 
assumptions they are holding. 
Scientific Discovery 
Within the realm of scientific discovery the two major elements that need to be explored from a 
critical realist perspective are those of it as an explanatory critique and its claim of having an 
emancipatory role. It is also important to note that any empirical inquiry carried out along critical 
realist lines obviously entails examining the range of possible mechanisms at play and analysing 
which are to be studied and which are felt, in the particular context being studied, to have the most 
impact.  
Critical realists believe that explanatory critiques have an important role to play in the development 
of a free and equal society as Bhaskar and Collier (1998c) state: “They expose not just false beliefs, 
but the false beliefs by which oppression and injustice are disguised, whether consciously or not, 
and perpetrated’ (p389). The aim is that theory can and does transform practice. They also go on to 
explain the key element to explanatory critiques as being ‘the ideas integral to a society can be 
logically contradictory, and to show that they are is to criticise them and so to criticise that society’ 
(Bhaskar and Collier 1998c, p 394). Another important element to undertaking critical realist 
research is best described by Bhaskar (1989b) who states: 'At its core, critical realism rests on the 
assumption that the accounts of the research participants are valid scientific data that can lead to 
consequential social transformation if properly interpreted' (p. 271). In accepting this it gives 
credibility to undertaking a range of research methodologies in any study. 
As identified earlier by Archer (1998), an important aspect of critical realism and particularly if it is 
to have a role as an explanatory critique is the idea of both; horizontal explanation, the explanation 
of events by mechanisms and antecedent causes (or stimulus); and, vertical explanation, the 
explanation of one mechanism by another more basic one. It is through both of these explanations 
that the mechanism(s) should be explored to be more accurate in any findings and proposals. This 
entails not only a widening of our knowledge of social systems and structures but also a deepening 
of our knowledge. Or in Collier’s (1994) terms an ‘explanation requires 2 terms: that which is to be 
explained – the explanandum and that which explains it – the explanans’ (p 50). I will return to this 
when reviewing the literature on disability, inclusion and special education. 
The second area that needs to be explored is that of critical realism’s emancipatory potential  
Emancipation, from Bhaskar’s perspective, is dependent ‘upon the transformation of structures, not 
the alteration or amelioration of states of affairs’ (1998a, p 410). Critical realism is therefore 
grounded in scientific theory and also revolutionary in objective or intent.  
A cautionary note is sounded by a number of authors in relation to both the scientific claims 
sounded by critical realism and also with regards to its emancipatory potential, which I would 
concur with (Benton, 1998; Collier, 1994; Sayer, 2000).  
It must also be recognised that enlightening people or facilitating self-enlightenment as to unwanted 
determinations or illusions is not a sufficient a condition in isolation and may lead to increased 
dissonance and despair ‘for emancipation to take place the mechanisms generating the problems 
must be removed or blocked’ (Sayer 2000, p 160).  
Given the concern with using the terminology emancipatory, a more accurate term in relation to this 
study may be the use of transformative. In this study the word 'transformative' is seen in terms of 'a 
profound change in consciousness in both the researcher and the researched' (Egbo, 2005, p268-9). 
As such this approach requires critical reflection, probing and questioning with some realignment of 
perspectives which hopefully in turn would act as a mediating force for social praxis. Whilst it was 
never going to be possible to go into significant depth in terms of the ontological and 
epistemological premises which formulate critical realism, what follows is my attempt to draw out 
the key tenets of critical realism, particularly in relation to the focus of this paper.  
Key Tenets 
1. Critical realists’ believe that there is a world existing independently of our knowledge of it 
and therefore all knowledge is fallible.  
2. Critical realists’ believe that knowledge is transient and it is important to recognise that it is 
relative to the historical, social and political context in which it was produced.  
3. Critical realists’ view of social reality is that individuals both reproduce and transform social 
structures as well as are formed by them, whilst social structures both shape and place 
constraints on individuals but are also the result of continuous activity by individuals.  
4. The critical realist view of human actions is that they may be associated with 
unacknowledged conditions, unintended consequences, the exercise of tacit skills and/or 
unconscious motivation. 
5. Social structures are real things which have causal powers which may, or may not, be 
activated. 
6. Critical realism recognises that because we are often shaped outside of our conscious 
awareness, it offers us a way forward through its emancipatory/transformational potential.  
Disability: an unnecessary duality? 
Whilst it is necessary to briefly explore the issues, from a critical realist perspective, around 
competing paradigms within an understanding of disability as this informs the discussion into 
special education and inclusion, it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into significant depth and 
analysis on this issue, although a number of other researchers have done so and I would refer you to 
them as a starting point (Barton, 1996; Low, 2006; Slee, 1998).  
From looking at a range of literature into current practice and beliefs in disability it tends to argue 
for either the need to identify disability as within the individual so that appropriate interventions can 
be developed (Kauffman, 1999; Kavale & Mostert, 2005) or within societal structures and beliefs 
which create the disability rather than it being inherently within the individual (Barton, 1987; 
Oliver, 1986; Soder, 1989).  
The individual or, as it is often referred to, medical model of disability believes that all the ensuing 
difficulties are within the individual and therefore their ‘faults’ need to addressed in order to put 
these right. For many, this is what special education was founded on and continues to operate from 
this paradigm (Oliver, 1988; Tomlinson, 1985) with a medical diagnosis being required in many 
states in Australia to access special education services and funding. 
Recently, there has been greater acceptance towards the social view of disability (Clark, Dyson, 
Millward, & Skidmore, 1995; Thomas & Loxley, 2001). This is at odds with the way special 
education has been and is structured and this will be explored in more detail in the next section.  
In relation to the social view of disability, some argue that 'difference is not a euphemism for defect, 
for abnormality, for a problem to be worked out through technical and assimilationist education 
policies, diversity is a social fact' (Armstrong, Armstrong, & Barton, 1998, p.34). Therefore 
differences and diversity should be promoted and that we need to fully understand these in order to 
know what adaptations and changes are required to enable those with impairments to enjoy 
improved wellbeing and equality of access to educational opportunities.  
In line with a critical realist view of causal relations, that there is a dual character to individuals and 
society; structure and agency, an increasing number of writers are starting to suggest that this 
duality is unhelpful in reality (Low, 2006; Norwich, 2002; Terzl, 2005). To exemplify this it could 
be seen that for those who would argue that the social view of disability is the totality of the 
interrelationship, the danger could become that if there is an absence of any specification of the 
concept of difference, how can difference be celebrated, and how can an appropriate educational 
experience be developed and provided.  
Shakespeare (1993) amongst others argues that the social model of disability needs to be 
reconceptualised to include the experience of impairment (Lindsay, 2003; Norwich, 1993; 
Shakespeare, 1993; Terzl, 2005). Norwich (1993) believes that those who advocate the social model 
of disability can be contradictory in their arguments when they state that all the difficulty lies within 
society's inability to adapt itself to the characteristics of the child, whilst also demanding that there 
should be an interaction between the individual and the school. Indeed, from a critical realist 
perspective, it is only through the interrelationship between individual and society that 
transformation will be brought about. It is therefore proposed that a move away from the duality of 
views currently present within many of the fields of disability towards an acceptance of the causal 
relations between society and the individual is helpful in providing a way forward particularly in the 
fields of inclusion and special education to which I will now move. 
Special Education V Inclusion 
I have deliberately headed this section as special education versus inclusion as I think this is at the 
core of the difficulty in moving from where (special) education currently is to where I believe it 
needs to be. If the discussion remains, for some, at just the level of criticising the other view then I 
believe progress will be very slow as the focus is taken away from the key issue of how is a more 
inclusive education system developed. 
Using a critical realist lens with which to review the literature in these fields there appears to be 
some issues at the forefront of the discussion which need to be unpacked further. There is the tenet 
that all knowledge is both fallible and transient and therefore context, both historical and social, 
needs to be examined. In relation to special education this will involve looking at its knowledge 
base and how, through another critical realist tenet; that of social structures having causal powers, 
new members are affected by its culture. Using the same tenets, I will then examine the literature 
around inclusion; how it has taken the moral ground and, the competing views as to how it should 
be realised. A final important element in this discussion is also the use or misuse of language that 
will lead into the beliefs and values (mechanisms) I see as operating in special education towards 
inclusion. 
Viewing Special Education through a critical realist lens 
Knowledge tradition of general education is grounded in psychology and scientific management 
which means its practices and discourses are predisposed to the belief that school organisations are 
rational and therefore school failure is a pathological condition. Therefore the issue lies in a 
problem within the individual and so education does not need to question its conventional practice. 
Special education could be seen to be an even more extreme version being strongly based on 
psychology, sociology and biology disciplines, where the focus is on diagnosis and intervention 
based on this and its strong links with behaviour theory.  
Thomas and Loxley (2001) suggest that special education has always suffered an inferiority 
complex because it has no core beliefs and understandings itself and therefore has often borrowed 
its epistemological tenets and research methods from its more recognised allied disciplines of 
psychology and sociology. In doing so they have not critically examined them to see whether or not 
they are founded and appropriate, and this has become the prevailing view. They argue that 
psychologists and sociologists within the field of education have systematically 'outlawed' certain 
types of knowledge as not being scientific and value free, objective, and therefore not permissible. 
In doing so they identify that knowledge in and around special education has become so 
compartmentalised by those academic disciplines that it would be a very brave set of practitioners 
who would dare to move outside the professional prevailing dominant view and the possible 
outcomes of doing so could amount to a form of 'professional suicide', and within this type of 
intellectual atmosphere it is unlikely that free thinking will occur.  
This, from a critical realist perspective is unacceptable as a great deal of the ‘knowledge’ associated 
with the scientific disciplines would not be viewed as fallible, transient or related to context. As 
Swann (1985) contends ‘Psychology and education are enterprises guided by radically different 
ground rules. Much confusion has been wrought, much of it unrecognised, by the failure to 
understand this' (cited in Thomas and Loxley, 2001, p.35).  Therefore the knowledge that much of 
special education is founded on is not the ‘truth’ but instead fallible, from a critical realist 
perspective. 
In addition to the knowledge gained through training to become a special education teacher, it is 
proposed that often the major influences on knowledge and ‘truth’ come from senior staff and peers 
when individuals first move into the ‘practical field’ of special education. Information and 
knowledge is ‘received’ at all times of life but I believe that the most powerful messages are 
‘received’ once the individual is working in the field on a daily basis. Therefore the dominant 
culture of the setting will often have a significant impact on developing the individuals’ views of 
what knowledge and truth in the ‘real world’ are. The role of induction into a profession can further 
entrench the views that have become ‘truth’ over time and are used to 'socialise' the new member 
into the profession once they have internalised the skills and knowledge deemed to be important 
(Mittler, 2000; Riddell, 1996; Slee, 2005). 
The critical realist view suggests that we are often shaped outside of our consciousness and 
therefore the lenses through which information and knowledge are viewed are inevitably highly 
influenced by the prevailing culture of the group. As stated by Crotty: ‘For each of us when we first 
see the world in a meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses bestowed on 
upon us by our culture’ (1998, p.54). 
Also, by the very nature of the interaction between special educationalists and between special 
educationists and the ‘system’, powerful discourses can often take place to further embed the ‘truth’ 
as to what is and isn’t reality for those operating within the system. As Thomas and Loxley say:  
'The past hundred years have seen the development of mechanisms, procedures, 
measuring instruments and practices which have had the object of identifying 
and moving pupils into segregated forms of schooling. The notion that special 
education operates as a filtering device to render more manageable the majority 
of the system has now become part of the received wisdom of critical thinking 
about special education...' (2001, p.76). 
Further to this idea, it is also apposite to mention the importance critical realism places on the 
social, political and historical context of knowledge development. Within the disability field this is 
supported by Barton (1999), who contends that education cannot be seen within a social and 
political vacuum and cites Sultana (1997) who states: 'schooling cannot be divorced from the wider 
social order, and schools and educators are not and cannot be 'neutral' and 'apolitical' channels for 
equally 'neutral' and 'apolitical' knowledge. Whatever we make happen in schools - constantly and 
inevitably - gives messages defining what it means to be 'human', 'good' and 'normal' in particular 
social contexts’ (p.54). Slee (1998) and Skrtic (1995) would also endorse this understanding with 
the field of special education. 
In relation to the historical context of special education there are competing views as to why it was 
established and why it continues in spite of the overwhelming support for the concept of inclusion. 
Whilst not agreeing with the concept, Tomlinson (1982), identified that many in special education 
would see its sense of itself as a profession as been premised on the liberal ideology of benevolent 
humanitarianism; the duty that a society has on caring for its weaker members. Many others believe 
that the continuance of special education is down to an attempt to maintain the status of the special 
education 'industry', teachers and administrators in regular schools (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2005; Fulcher, 
1989; Slee, 2001). Slee (2001) is particularly self-critical of his time as a special educator as giving 
him more sophisticated methods and approaches aimed at promulgating special education and he 
was a 'card-carrying designator of disability' (p.171).  
Tomlinson (1985) also talks about the expansion of special education as being linked to 
professional interests and refutes the suggestion that much of the expansion is down to accident, 
spontaneous adjustment, progress and benevolence. She cites Archer (1979) in affirming her belief 
that educational structures are a result of the interests of those social groups who manage education. 
In relation to special education educationalists, psychologists and medical practitioners all have a 
vested interest in expanding the numbers of pupils identified as ‘special’. Those working in special 
education have an interest in increasing numbers as do mainstream teachers under the pressures of 
greater accountability as well as placing the problem with the child as opposed to their teaching. 
Thomas and Loxley (2001) believe the growth and maintenance of special education has been as 
much about expediency as oppression with a focus on the psychology of politicians, planners and 
administrators stating that to justify their position they need to identify problems and then provide 
visible solutions to these problems - just moving the funding into mainstream education to assist it 
in becoming more inclusive would be seen as an abdication of responsibility as it could not be seen: 
‘The special system is thereby geared toward providing visible 'services' designed to help' (p.43).  
From this brief look at special education and what it is founded on I will now turn to look at the 
literature and research on inclusion: the use of language and the competing views as to the way 
forward. 
Inclusion 
A number of researchers have noted that the use of language is very powerful in the debate around 
inclusion and in debating other potentially contentious issues (Slee, 1996; Watson, 2005). One of 
the problems that inclusion proponents face is the difficulties experienced in coming up with an 
agreed definition of inclusion. As the focus of this paper is on inclusion in relation to those with a 
disability the definitions explored are in relation to this also. 
Definitions of inclusion are many and varied but amongst the more succinct ones are provided by 
Lipsky and Gartner (1996; 1999) who describe it in terms of students with disabilities having full 
membership of an age-appropriate class in their local schools with the required additional support 
aids and/or services. Skrtic, Sailor and Gee (1996), argue in a similar fashion that it goes beyond 
physical placement and also involves the schools meeting the needs of all children in common but 
variable environments and activities dependent on need. In identifying these two definitions it 
important to say that they come from a different paradigm as to the way forward for inclusion and 
this is often seen as a weakness by those arguing against inclusion, but more of this later. 
A potential difficulty, in terms of moving forward towards a more inclusive education system and 
away from the polarised discourses prevalent in special education and inclusion, is that proponents 
of inclusion have often taken a very moral stance in terms of why inclusion is good and special 
education is bad. In doing so, they have either alienated some of those who could potentially assist 
in the move towards a more inclusive education system or those who feel ‘threatened’ have 
‘adopted’ the word in the name of reinvented special education practice (Slee, 1996). In doing so 
the word ‘inclusion’ has almost become unusable in any coherent manner. As Thomas and Loxley 
(2001) identify that the word 'inclusion' is now de rigueur on all mission statements, policy 
documents and political speeches and in doing so has now become a cliché which is obligatory in 
the discourse of all right-minded people. 
Kauffman (1999) states that he believes the word inclusion has become virtually meaningless being 
used as a catch-word for a whole range of potentially opposite approaches, citing what Salman 
Rushdie has called 'the new incomprehensibility'. It is interesting that even those with some of the 
most strident views in relation to disability, such as Oliver (1996), note that the word inclusion may 
have had such success at an ideological level that it is almost impossible to examine it critically. 
From a critical realist perspective this is a problem because it is almost proposing that the ‘truth’ 
has been discovered and in doing so it suggests there is no future knowledge to be gained through 
our theoretical interaction with the world. I would concur, as nearly everyone would from a moral 
viewpoint, that inclusion would be a step forward from where education for students with 
disabilities currently is but I would reject that we need look no further from a theoretical viewpoint 
and instead just focus on implementing inclusion, as important as that is. For Thomas and Loxley 
(2001), inclusion 'is about providing a framework within which all children...can be valued equally' 
(p119), and it is to the issues of values and beliefs that I will move shortly. 
As stated earlier there are a number of competing views within proponents of inclusion as to the 
way forward and there is also debate as to what should be the values and beliefs that drive this 
change. Many see inclusion as really about extending the comprehensive ideal in education , and 
therefore the strive should be more towards what does the education system need to look like in 
order to promote tolerance, diversity and equity (Ainscow, 1995; Carrington, 1999; Lipsky & 
Gartner, 2005b; Skrtic, 1991a; Slee, 2001; UNESCO, 2000) rather than the current focus on 'special 
educational needs' and all the difficulties and baggage that this terminology brings (Barton, 1987; 
Clark et al., 1995). Some writers also argue that education should be guided by democratic 
principles (Artiles, 2003; Lipsky & Gartner, 2005a; Nilholm, 2006; Skrtic, Sailor, & Gee, 1996) 
rather than any other factors currently in play such as the demands of the marketisation of education 
(Bines, 1995; Riddell, 2000). 
Mitchell (2005) suggests that the rationale for inclusive education revolves around three main 
arguments; the first being that it is a basic human right and is linked to equity and democracy, 
supported by a number of other researchers (Clark et al., 1995; Nilholm, 2006; Slee, 2001); the 
second being a shift in emphasis from individual impairments to changes in the social context with 
schools focussing on required pedagogical changes, and the third that as there is no clear 
demarcation between those with and without disabilities, therefore there is no discrete identification 
that specific categories of students learn in different ways and so why separate provision. Exploring 
the rationale from a critical realist perspective, the first argument is one that critical realism would 
not have disagreement with being based on an emancipatory principle; the second has already been 
covered in that a critical realist view of the literature is more likely to support the interplay between 
individual and society rather than the potential of focussing just on a social context, and this is 
linked to the third point. 
In terms of a way forward, Skrtic (1995) argues that the problem with inclusion is that it is based on 
naive pragmatism, which whilst it questions the models and theories that the current professional 
practice is based upon, it unreflectively accepts the assumptions, theories and metatheories that 
stand behind them. He, along with others, articulates a more radical need to restructure schools 
rather than just the focus on inclusion (Lipsky & Gartner, 2005a; Slee, 2001). Although on similar 
lines to Skrtic, less radical approaches to the organisational paradigm (Clark et al., 1995) have been 
proposed by some. These focus on working with schools as they currently are in order to bring 
about more inclusive practice (Ainscow & Kaplan, 2005; Carrington, 1999; Carrington & 
Robinson, 2004; Deppeler & Harvey, 2004; Forlin, 2004).  
In spite of the excellent work of these researchers and practitioners there is still a long way to go in 
spite of inclusion being seen as an important philosophical stance, as is noted by Stainback & 
Stainback (1992) when stating; 'special' education has operated for so long, many schools 
unfortunately do not know...how to adapt and modify the curriculum and instructional programs to 
meet diverse student needs' (p.40). I intend to now explore the issues around beliefs and values of 
those within special education as I would contend that, in relation to inclusion, whilst hearts have 
mostly been won there is still much to be done to win heads. By exploring where people are 
‘coming from’ there remains the chance of moving the discussion forward.  
Beliefs and Values: or the arguments against inclusion. 
As I looked at earlier, Bhaskar argues that human sciences are necessarily non-neutral and that 
beliefs and values impact on how individuals act (1989a). Furthermore he believes that 
unacknowledged (unconscious) motivators limit the individuals understanding of themselves, and 
therefore this is an important element to examine as well as potentially offering a way forward. 
MacIntyre (1988) states ‘to adopt a standpoint of a tradition thereby commits one to its view of 
what is true or false and, in so committing one, prohibits one from adopting any rival standpoints’ 
(p 367). The same cannot be said to be true within the discourse around inclusion. Those who argue 
for special education tend to take one of three stances, either to ‘adopt’ inclusion as their own 
through 'linguistic dexterity' whilst making very few changes to practice based on the medical-
psychological model of individual deficit (Slee, 2001).  
In spite of the almost overwhelming acceptance of the concept, if not the reality, of inclusion there 
are dissenting voices. Critics of inclusion often refer to ideology or rhetoric (Croll & Moses, 2000; 
Hornby, 1999; Wilson, 1999)  and use these terms as inherent criticisms of inclusion as the 
arguments for are not based on objective measures (Hegarty, 1993, 2001; Kavale & Mostert, 2005). 
Kauffman (1999) believes that history shows that without separate provision the interests of 
'exceptional children' are not met, although he does not refer to any particular authors or studies. He 
also believes that social scientists have fallen into believing that a new idea is a way of developing 
their status within academia which has no facts to back it up. 
Many of these arguments fall back to the already challenged, from a critical realist viewpoint, 
positivist stance on which special education is premised.  
I want to, in line with a critical realist perspective, also acknowledge the way politics and policy can 
and do influence the context people are working in. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go 
through policies in terms of what they contain and how they have been enacted in settings but I 
believe it is pertinent to explore what has been found in a number of western industrialised 
countries that have policies to promote inclusive practice but who also promote a marketised 
educational environment. A number of researchers have found that the presence of marketisation of 
education can often lead to a segregationary impact and as such the  presence of this alongside a 
push for inclusion may be mutually exclusive (Bines, 1995; Rouse & Florian, 1997).  
An additional major issue in many current systems is that the terminology is often used as a 
‘gatekeeper’ for additional resources rather than encouraging inclusive practices, and this is 
certainly an issue as schools are often financially penalised for being successful by resources being 
taken away if the individual ‘improves’. This has had the negative impact of pushing the special 
needs debate towards a scramble for additional resources rather than a focus on the development of 
quality provision (Norwich, 1993). 
Whether articulated or not these often impact on how people perceive what is being proposed and it 
is important to note that in enacting policies we ultimately bring our own interpretations to bear. 
Bowe et al. argue: 'Practitioners do not confront policy texts as naive readers, they come with 
histories with experiences, with values and purposes of their own.' (cited in Thomas and Loxley, 
2001, p.99). In relation to disability the social categorisation of individuals as being somehow 
'special' is constructed in and legitimised through the kind of policies which are developed in this 
area. Policy is rarely neutral and the language used can and does influence how individuals and 
what is being promoted within the policy are viewed and enacted.  
Conclusion 
I would suggest that critical realism provides a possible way forward from some of the current 
entrenched positions that those arguing for or against inclusion can find themselves.  
Critical realism clearly identifies its ontological and epistemological premises, unlike nearly all 
other writings. It also avoids the fallacy of homogeneity, where characteristics given to one group 
or setting are assumed to apply to individuals within that group. It maintains the unique context of 
each situation whilst exposing underlying mechanisms which may or may not be at play in other 
situations (Slee, 1998; Thomas & Loxley, 2001). Due to its explicit examination of values within 
knowledge it avoids the fallacy of value-free knowledge, where knowledge of educational 
institutions and systems is seen as value free.  
Some are already operating along similar lines to critical realism when stating that they are not 
looking for theoretical closure but are looking for ever clearer explanations of complex realities in 
relation to what is happening (Slee, 1998). Thomas and Loxley (2001), also support this point when 
they refer to the danger of researcher’s wanting to identify 'grand themes' to explain why children 
do not succeed or behave inappropriately, this leads to grand answers which fail to take account the 
individual circumstances at play and the context.  
Using a critical realist framework to show that all knowledge is fallible and rooted within the 
historical, social and political contexts of the time it may provide an opportunity to move away 
from the potential ‘finger wagging’ that can take place by both sides of the discussion. It is 
proposed that by thinking about what might or should be the world can be shown as it currently is 
and all should be encouraged us to ask searching questions about what is currently so.  
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